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OBSERVING REASONABLE CONSUMERS: COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY,
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR AND CONSUMER LAW

Norman I. Silber*

I. Introduction
One widely shared premise of
modem American legal thought is
that the law should not readily
proscribe or punish conduct that is
reasonable or unavoidable. Toward that end, courts and legislatures usually search for legal standards that correspond to our
empirical knowledge of human be-

"[C]ourts and legislatures
usually search for legal
standards that correspond to
our empirical knowledge of
human behavior."

studies of the consumer decisionmaking process. Part II discusses
the neoformalist "rational utilitymaximizer" standard and its underlying assumptions. Part III explores several recent studies of
consumer behavior and discusses
how the empirical evidence is incompatible with the neoformalist
prescriptions for consumer law.
Part IV considers whether and to
what extent this research should be
applied in formulating legal standards that govern consumer transactions. This article concludes that
courts and legislatures appropriately take into consideration consumers' cognitive limitations in
developing regulations and "reasonable consumer" standards.
II.Neoformalist Viewpoints

havior. In response to behavioral
psychologists' experiments and observations of consumers, courts
have come to appreciate limits and
errors in the consumer decisionmaking process, and have developed "reasonable consumer" standards in accord with those
cognitive realities.
In the past decade, concern has
grown over the impact of "psychology-driven" legal standards. In
fact, several legal theorists argue
that legislators and jurists misuse
or rely excessively on psychological
theories developed by consumer
behavioralists.I These include
"neoformalists," who claim that
instead of encouraging freedom of
contract and promoting economic
efficiency, "psychology-driven"
standards rest on incomplete infor-2
mation about consumer behavior
and thereby tolerate, even promote, consumer unreasonableness,
irrationality and ignorance. Although the neoformalist views
have merit, they disregard important realities of consumer decisionmaking.
This article examines neoformalist views and recent empirical
Volume 2, Number 3/Spring, 1990

For neoformalists, promises are
inviolable and consumer assent to
contract terms should be strictly
interpreted and enforced. 3 The
most extreme of neoformalist postures is exemplified by a Camus
character: "No excuses ever, for
anyone; that's my principle at the
outset. I deny the good intention,
the respectable mistake, the indiscretion, the extenuating circumstance."4 The view that consumer

promises should be strictly enforced, and that consumers' ability
to enter into agreements should be
unfettered, is founded on the assumption that consumers are motivated by and effectively able to
pursue what they believe to be in
their own best interest.5
A leading discussion of the neoformalist analysis of contract law is
Charles Fried's Contract as Promise,6 which attaches great importance to the sanctity of the contractual promise. Neoformalists
suggest that psychologically sensitive legal standards reduce the
moral clarity and precision of contract and tort law.7 Moreover, neoformalists argue that the freedom

to contract and the enforceability
of consumer contracts is being seriously diminished by the present
"reasonable consumer" standards.8 Irresponsible individual
behavior supposedly is excused
without promoting collective social or economic well-being.
These and related concerns have
led neoformalists to press for a new
approach to consumer transactions. Peter Huber, for example,
advocates a "journey back to contract," whereby consumers would
be more strictly held to their contractual commitments and would
be freer to contract away potential
liability claims. 9 Among other recommendations, Huber suggests
that courts (1) judge "deceptive"
and "misleading" practices against
a stricter, more objective standard
of consumer reasonableness, rationality, and sophistication; and (2)
curb the ability of consumers to
escape the unhappy consequences
of risks they have contracted to

"[C]ourts and legislatures
appropriately take into
consideration consumers'
cognitive limitations in
developing regulations and
'reasonable consumer'
standards."
assume.' 0 Notably, these suggestions have found some favor in
judicial rulings and government
agency decisions in recent years."
(continued on page 70)
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III. Recent Consumer Behavioral
Research
Consumer behavioral research
indicates that consumers are limited in their ability to calculate and
maximize their expected utilities.
This deficiency exists, among other
reasons, because consumer choices
are affected by such external factors as "framing effects," 'puffery," and induced disinclinations
to maximize utility under particu-

"[N]eoformalists argue that
the freedom to contract and
the enforceability of
consumer contracts is being
seriously diminished by the
present 'reasonable
consumer' standards."
lar conditions. Human cognitive
limitations also play a role: for
example, inherent information
processing limits and inabilities to
estimate probabilities accurately.
Even when consumers can calculate probabilities accurately, "irrationality" may be reasonable
where the decisionmaking task is
overwhelming. As a result of these
cognitive limitations, "reasonable" consumers cannot consistently maximize their rational best
interests. Several cognitive errors
and limitations that prevent consumers from maximizing their expected utilities are discussed below.
A. Framing effects and puffery
The preferences of reasonable
consumers are susceptible to
"framing effects."'12 That is, in
some situations consumers will exhibit a marked preference for one
of two choices, based not exclusively on the objective, expected
value of the choices, but also upon
7n

(continued from page 69)

the way in which the choices are
presented.
In one study, two alternative
programs to combat an unusual
and deadly Asian disease were pro3
posed to two groups of people.'
Both groups were told that absent
any program 600 people would die
of the disease. One group of subjects was given the choice between
program A, which guaranteed that
200 people would be saved, and
program B, which offered a 1/3
probability that all 600 people
would be saved and a 2/3 probability that no one would be saved. The
second group was given the same
statistical choices, but the choices
were phrased in terms of lives lost,
instead of lives saved. In other
words, the second group of subjects
was given a choice between program C, which guaranteed that 400
people would die, and program D,
which offered a 1/3 probability
that no one would die and a 2/3
probability that all 600 people
would die.
Objectively, the expected value
of the choices (i.e., the value of the
particular outcome multiplied by
the probability that the outcome
would be realized) was identical:
under each choice 200 people
probably would be saved. According to neoformalists' assumptions,
the individuals should have been
indifferent between the choices.
However, despite the net equivalence of the choices, the individuals' preferences differed vastly depending upon how the choices
were "framed." When the alternative programs were stated in terms
of lives saved, 72% preferred the
certain alternative (choice A).
When the alternatives were stated
in terms of lives lost, 78% preferred
the riskierprogram (choice D).
Similar cognitive anomalies
were illustrated with this hypothetical:' 4 imagine yourself on your
way to a Broadway play with a pair
of tickets for which you have paid
$40. Upon entering the theater you

discover that you have lost the
tickets. Would you pay $40 for
another pair of tickets? Now imagine you are on your way to the
same play without having bought
tickets at all. Upon entering the
theater you realize that you have
lost $40 in cash. Would you now
buy tickets to the play? Most people presented with this situation
said they would be more likely to
buy new tickets if they had lost
money than if they had lost the
tickets, despite the fact that the two
situations are identical in objective
terms.
One possible explanation for
framing effects is that individuals
are inherently more reluctant toward placing at risk a prospective
gain than they are toward potentially worsening an anticipated
loss. That may explain why, in the
first example above, when presented with choosing between prospective gains, the individuals chose
the more certain alternative
(choice A), but when presented
with choosing between prospective

"As a result of ... cognitive
limitations, 'reasonable'
consumers cannot
consistently maximize their
rational best interests."
losses, the individuals chose the
riskier alternative (choice D). Stated differently, the individuals
"weigh[ed] out-of-pocket losses
more heavily than foregone gains
of equal expected value."' 5
Another hypothesis, the "regret
theory,"' 6 proposes that consumers' choices are affected by their
desire to avoid later finding that
they would have done better had
they chosen differently. For example, assume that two choices have
the same expected value, but
choice A has a higher probabilityof
the preferred outcome, whereas
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choice B has a higher value of the
preferred outcome. Consumers
tend to choose B because they do
not want later to regret choosing
the lesser valued A, should the
preferred outcome actually be real17
ized.
Neoformalists assume that consumer preferences reflect consumer values, independent of the context of the choice.' 8 Behavioralists'
studies indicate that this assumption is unwarranted, and that
courts should consider the consequences of framing effects. A court
inquiry into framing effects clearly
might have relevance, for example,
in determining whether some liability and warranty releases are the
product of poorly or deceptively
framed alternatives.
Framing studies also suggest further avenues of inquiry in advertising regulation. One way in which
sellers capitalize upon framing effects is through "two-sided" advertising appeals. This advertising
technique places particular emphasis on those product attributes that
are more important to consumers,
and downplays or even disclaims

greater advertiser
strengths, 2and
0
credibility.
"Puffery" is a related advertising tactic in which an advertiser
makes unsupported, subjective
opinions and exaggerations.
Courts do not consider such advertising practices to be deceptive, on
the assumption that consumers
recognize and are not deceived
into believing puffed claims. Researchers, however, have discovered that many consumers believe
that the puffed claims are partly or
entirely true, and therefore consumers' decisions 2are affected by
the puffed claims. '
Whatever the explanation for
the effects discovered by researchers, it appears that reasonable consumers are susceptible to arriving
at inconsistent opinions about substantively identical alternatives depending upon the context of the
marketing appeals. If "deceptive
advertising" is advertising capable
of manipulation and deceit, then
courts should consider framing effects and puffery in determining
whether a particular advertisement
is deceptive and thus improperly
has affected a consumer's decision.

"[R]easonable consumers
are susceptible to arriving at
inconsistent opinions about

B. Disinclinations to maximize
expected utility

substantively identical
alternatives depending upon
the context of the marketing
appeals."
product attributes that are less
important to consumers. By downplaying or disclaiming less important attributes, advertisers seek "to
establish credibility without deterring a purchase."' 9 In effect, advertisers appear more honest by "confessing" product weaknesses,
which are really less-preferred
product strengths. Research has
shown that, compared to one-sided
appeals (where the product is presented only in a positive fashion),
two-sided appeals lead to diminished perceived product weaknesses, increased perceived product
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Regulations that govern consumer transactions often are
founded on the assumption that
consumers are utility-maximizers
and will search for information
about products and services until
the search costs appear to outweigh
the benefits. 22 Empirical studies of
consumer shopping behavior, however, demonstrate the weakness of
any blanket assumption that "reasonable" consumers are inclined,
let alone able, to operate effectively
as rational utility-maximizers.
Disclosure rules regarding home
mortgages, for example, seem to
assume that homebuyers shop vigorously and compare alternatives. 23 However, a study of two
high-income Connecticut communities revealed that despite the
importance of the purchase,
"about one-third of homebuyers

spent less than a month actively
searching for a home and visited or
sought information about fewer
than six homes; almost one-half of
the homebuyers did not shop for a
loan. 12 4 In a study of real estate
closing costs, two-thirds of the
homebuyers sampled did not shop
for a lender, and over 80 percent
did not shop for a title insurer or
other provider of closing servic5
es. 2

"Empirical studies...
demonstrate the weakness of
any blanket assumption that
'reasonable' consumers are
inclined, let alone able, to
operate effectively as rational
utility- maximizers."
Why do consumers behave in a
way that confutes neoformalist
theory regarding such an important decision? According to one
theory, the greater the stress and
perceived risk in the decision, the
less effective the. decisionmaking
process.2 6 Real and perceived risks
involved in important purchasing
decisions can lead to "defensive
avoidance," a state in which the
consumer becomes frustrated by
the stress of choosing among hard
to compare, costly alternatives. 27 A
high level of risk also can lead to
"hypervigilance," in which further
information may be useful, but the
consumer thinks there is insufficient time to search for and assimilate that information. 28 "[Tihe
high stakes and overwhelming
complexity of the transaction will
paralyze many home buyers' desire
to shop for the best deal."' 29 "Irrationality" in this setting is a reasonable response to the decisionmaking circumstances because of
the high emotional costs involved.
C. Inaccurate probability estimates
Strictly holding a consumer to
all of a contract's terms is justifiable only if that consumer has
(continued on page 72)
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adequately consented to the contract. In determining whether "adequate consent" exists, neoformalists assume that consumers are
able accurately to anticipate the
consequences and calculate the potential value of their contracts.
Research has shown, however, that
individuals frequently err even in
simple calculations, and sometimes avoid complicated calculations entirely.
In one experiment, subjects

"In many cases involving form
contracts, 'the average
consumer knows that he
probably will be unable to fully
understand the dense text of
a form contract.... .'
were asked to determine the likelihood that a witness, who was
known to be 80 percent reliable,
correctly stated that a taxi was
blue, given that 15 percent of the
30
taxis in the vicinity were blue.
Most subjects confronted with this
problem colleges -

even students at elite
provided widely erro-

neous estimates: most estimated
the probability to be 80%, whereas
3
the probability is closer to 40%. 1
In another study, the vast majority
of the participants considered
themselves better-than-average
drivers; obviously many of them
overstated their abilities. 32 Absent
an injury to himself, the consumer
is reinforced in his belief that he is
safe: accidents happen to other
people. 33 As a result, consumers
demand less safety than 34the objective risk level warrants.
Where accurately estimating
probability is particularly difficult,
consumers frequently appear to
avoid that fallible process entirely
and proceed to solve consumer
problems not from probability calculations toward decisions, but the
other way around. For example,
72
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one psychologist suggests that
some people may decide to smoke
for arbitrary, uncalculated reasons. 35 Later they rationalize their
decision by assigning a low probability to getting lung cancer, and
only because they have already
36
chosen to smoke.
These studies indicate that lawmakers should not presume that
consumers are capable of making
certain risk decisions accurately
and in their best interests when
those decisions involve relatively
complex probability calculations.
This is true, for example, in estimating the likelihood and extent of
injury when consenting to a liability waiver, or in anticipating the
probability of default in assuming
a mortgage. In determining whether consumers have adopted such
risks, courts should consider the
limited ability of consumers to
calculate those risks and thereby
adequately consent to an agreement.
D. Information overload
Neoformalists would argue that
consumers who are able to understand all of the terms to a contract
should be held responsible for failing to do so. Consumers' ability to
understand contracts, however, is
significantly affected by the quantity and complexity of the information presented to them. Information overload, as consumer
psychologists use the term, is a
function of trying to "process too
much information in a limited
time." 37 It also may occur when the
information environment (i.e., the
ingredient label on a product or the
print in an apartment lease) is very
complex relative to the consumer's
time or expertise.
As a result of information overload, finding the desired information is more difficult and the consumer must spend more time and
effort in the search. Research indicates that when faced with at-

tempting to read and understand
complicated contract terms, normal consumers become anxious
and overwhelmed. 38 In many cases
involving form contracts, "the
average consumer knows that he
probably will be unable to fully
understand the dense text of a form
contract, whether term-by-term or
as an integrated whole. ' ' 39 If the
additional time, effort, and concomitant anxiety are sufficiently
great, the consumer reasonably
may respond by not searching for
the information at all or simply not
digesting the available information. 40 Information overload may
cause a consumer to choose a product or enter into a contract that, if
he had been able to acquire and
process all of the relevant informa4
tion, he would have rejected. '
Although consumers act on incomplete information in choosing to
avoid complicated text, they may
be entirely reasonable in not reading such text, considering the effort
required, the emotional consequences, and the prospects for understanding the information.

"[C]ourts in many situations
fail to appreciate how
different media create or
exacerbate information
processing problems."
The studies of information overload suggest an important function
for legal disclosure rules: to make
manageable the task consumers
face when the high "cost" of information processing inhibits effective decisionmaking. 42 Before the
federal Truth-in-Lending law, 43 for
example, information concerning
interest rates was displayed in a
variety of ways. Consumers could
not compare different creditors'
loan terms unless the consumers
converted different creditors' disclosure methods to a common metVolume 2, Number 3/Spring, 1990
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ric; this required complex calculations and comparison among large
amounts of dense text. As a result
of the Truth-in-Lending regulations, consumers are faced with a
less overwhelming and confusing
array of information.
The reality of consumer anxiety
and avoidance suggests that the
strict "duty to read" implied by
formalist contract law is not justifiable in the case of dense form
contracts. 44 Courts may appropriately find that consumers are acting reasonably in avoiding the
complicated texts, and so should
not punish reasonable consumers
by binding them to uncomprehended contract terms.
E. Other variables affecting
consumer decisionmaking
Many other variables beyond
the control of individual consumers affect consumers' ability to
understand the terms of a bargain
or the value of a purchase. One
such variable is the consumer's
familiarity with product attributes
and customs of the trade. In Hall v.
T.L. Kemp Jewelry, Inc.,4 5 for example, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of a jewelry
store owner who had made no
express warranty as to the value of
a bracelet, although the jeweler
orally stated that the bracelet was

"Courts and legislators would
be unwise to ignore the
accumulating empirical
evidence about how
consumers actually make
decisions."
worth $2,000 and then mailed an
appraisal that claimed the bracelet
was worth more than $2,600. An
independent appraiser subsequently estimated that the bracelet was
worth less than $600. In rejecting
the plaintiff's claim, the court held
that "[t]he law recognizes that
some seller's statements are only
sales palaver and not express war-
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ranties. ' '46 Should consumers be
expected to know that a seller's
appraisal does not warrant value
other than for insurance purposes?
Can courts expect consumers to be
aware that an explicit statement of
value for one purpose is "palaver"
(idle talk) for another?
Courts occasionally also recognize that otherwise unobjectionable selling practices may become
misleading because of the sales
medium used. In Committee on
47
ProfessionalEthics v. Humphrey,
for example, an attorney's self-laudatory television advertising was
held misleading to consumers because of the "special problems" of
persuasion in electronic media advertising. 48 Although advertising
trade publications abound with articles about the "effectiveness" of
various advertising media, courts
in many situations fail to appreciate how different media create or
exacerbate information processing
problems.
Researchers have explored other
factors affecting cognitive processing: availability of product alternatives; familiarity with product attributes; uncertainty about similar
products; the frequency with which
consumers make a particular type
of decision; the number of attributes per available alternative; the
information source and format; the
background "noise" level; time
pressure; and the consumer's reli49
ance on the seller's expertise.
Unexplored by consumer behavioralists, consumer illiteracy is an
absolute barrier to effective information processing that represents
a growing problem in the United
States.
Consumer behavioralist literature is replete with factors that
directly affect how consumers process information concerning product attributes, proper product uses,
and the risks that consumers believe they assume in entering into
contracts. Any "reasonableness"
standard that purportedly reflects
consumers' ability to adequately
assent to contracts should, at a
minimum, allow for the consideration of these factors.

IV. Applying Behavioral Theories
to Consumer Law

Having discussed some of the
cognitive limitations that detrimentally affect consumer decisionmaking, it must be emphasized
that courts should not excuse or
encourage consumer irresponsibility. Courts should not release consumers from responsibility for all
of their poor choices. Minimizing

"Adopting a neoformalist
'rational utility-maximizer'
position in effect punishes
consumers for failing to live
up to a standard they are
unable to - or are prevented
from - achieving."
consumer accountability for all
poor choices simply diminishes incentives for consumers to choose
well. The central questions raised
by this discussion concern when
legal standards should be sensitive
to consumers' cognitive limitations and when cognitive errors are
more likely to be reduced by regulation than by judicial decisions.
Exclaiming the reality of cognitive limitations is not the same as
proclaiming the superiority of regulatory solutions. There inevitably
is a gap between what a consumer
gets and what he would have expected to get, if circumstances had
been ideal. Whether this gap justifies regulation is the subject of
debate.
Numerous statutes and government regulations are justified by
considerations of consumers' cognitive limitations. The FTC, for
example, argues that it legitimately
may regulate the remedies provided to consumer debtors in the
context of consumer security
agreements and home mortgages,
in part because there is no effective
negotiation over, and thus no market in, remedies.5 0 Cognitively,
"debtors do not expect to default;
therefore, they do not bargain over
(continued on page 74)
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the effects of default or shop
around for less onerous default
terms."'" Auto safety standards require elimination of those risks
that are "unreasonable" to consumers.5 2 The Consumer Product
Safety Act 53 requires the Consumer
Product Safety Commission to remove all "unreasonable risks"
from consumer products and to do
so in a manner that is "in the
public interest. ' 54 A similar mandate is given to the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration.55
Replacing a market mechanism
by a regulatory mechanism should
depend on whether an intrinsic
market weakness exists - including within that concept consumers'
cognitive limitations and
whether regulation is more effective and efficient than the forces of
the marketplace. Professor Scott
aptly has warned that the literature
on consumer cognitive error and
limitations should not be misunderstood by lawyers:
The "error" in human judgment and decisionmaking
that the psychological literature posits is the deviation
between empirically observed behavior and some
theoretical conception of ideal rationality. The legal analyst must guard against the
problematic assumption that
inherently fallible behavior is
correctable through legal reg56
ulation.
Clearly, some consumer decisionmaking limitations may not be
correctable through regulation.
Where common law remedies are
appropriate, consumers' cognitive
limitations should be acknowledged and taken into consideration
by the judiciary in formulating
''reasonable consumer" standards.
V. Recommendations and
Conclusion
Certain recommendations for
74
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lawmakers and courts emerge from
reviewing the consumer behavioralist literature. When determining
whether consumers possess understanding sufficient to meaningfully
assume a cost or a risk, both external influences on consumers and
innate consumer processing abilities should be examined. Where
appropriate, such an examination
should consider cognitive problems including intentionally deceptive framing effects and puffery.
Courts should explore whether
consumers can accurately make the
probability assessments that are
minimally necessary for assenting
to contractual costs and risks. Information overload and consumer
anxiety also should be considered
in deciding whether consumers understand the terms of agreements,
or whether they are reasonable in
not pursuing available information
prior to entering into agreements.
Courts and legislators would be
unwise to ignore the accumulating
empirical evidence about how consumers actually make decisions. In
many instances consumers are prevented or dissuaded from effectively maximizing their utilities by
manipulative seller practices. In
others, the complexity of accurately computing the costs and risks of
a bargain, and thereby determining
the "maximum expected utility,"
prevents consumers from truly understanding crucial contract terms
and requirements. Adopting a neoformalist "rational utility-maximizer" position in effect punishes
consumers for failing to live up to a
standard they are unable to - or
are prevented from - achieving.
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